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Equal Protection and Welfare Legislation: The
Need for a Principled Approach
The Warren Court developed an equal protection legacy ripe
for unprincipled judicial intervention' and expansive notions of
equality. 2 By limiting the number of classifications found suspect
and interests deemed fundamental, the Burger Court curtailed
the most speculative aspects of equal protection and also re-
stricted judicial use of strict scrutiny.' The Burger Court, how-
ever, has applied inconsistent criteria for minimal rationality re-
view of legislation not involving suspect classifications or funda-
mental rights. The Supreme Court decision in Maher v. Roe,'
denying an equal protection claim to Medicaid payments for elec-
tive abortions, illustrates the Court's inconsistent application of
minimal rationality standards to socioeconomic legislation. This
comment analyzes Maher in light of recent irreconcilable Su-
preme Court decisions involving similar equal protection claims
to welfare payments. It shows that the Court's standard of review
vacillates between deferential abdication to the legislature and
unexplained judicial interventionism, and concludes that until
the Court adheres to a consistent and principled approach to
minimal rationality review, equal protection will remain an area
for unrestrained imposition of judicial, rather than constitu-
tional, values. The alternative offered is an articulated rationality
test that would limit the Court to reviewing state-articulated,
rather than Court-hypothesized, objectives. 5
1. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rv.
1, 8-10 (1972); Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 59-80. The Karst and Horowitz article praises the
Warren Court's "egalitarian revolution" in equal protection analysis and notes that even
though some classifications are far from irrational, they are nonetheless unconstitutional
because they produce inequities unacceptable in this generation's idealization of America.
See also Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return to the "Natural-
Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 716 (1969). The author identifies Justice
Douglas as the leader of the egalitarian majority.
2. As Justice Harlan noted:
This resurgence of the expansive view of equal protection carries the seeds of
more judicial interference with the state and federal legislative process, much
more indeed than does the judicial application of "due process" according to
traditional concepts, . . . about which some members of the Court have ex-
pressed fears as to its potentialities for setting us judges "at large."
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 677 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. See text accompanying notes 26-43 infra.
4. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
5. Purposes explicitly set forth in the statutory preamble would not be the only
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Traditionally, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibited a state from discriminating between two
similarly situated classes of people unless the disparate treatment
rationally related to the legislative purpose.6 Recognizing the bal-
ance between the roles of the Court and the legislature, the Court
presumed legislatures acted constitutionally, even though legisla-
tion often resulted in some inequality.7 Allowing legislatures con-
siderable flexibility, the Court tolerated both overinclusive and
underinclusive classifications.8 Under this minimal standard of
review, the Warren Court gave deference to imaginable support-
ing rationales and conceivable legislative objectives when review-
ing socioeconomic legislation.? The Burger Court, however, has
been less willing to hypothesize legitimate legislative objectives
to justify a classification.'0
judicially cognizable purpose. The Court would still have an obligation to review any
relevant legislative history. In elaborating upon the proper subjects of judicial inquiry into
legislative intent or purpose, the Court has gone so far as to say that in extraordinary
circumstances, the Court might call upon members of the decision making body to testify
concerning the purpose of the official action. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitian
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977).
6. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960).
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enact-
ing laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The consti-
tutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that,
in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
7. "In the determination of a statute's constitutionality, . the 'purpose' of a mea-
sure is generally only a legal abstraction attributed to the statute by the courts; it denotes
the permissible objective which the legislature might have had in enacting the statute."
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. Rav., 1065, 1091 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
8. A reasonable classification is one that includes all persons who are similarly situ-
ated with respect to the purpose of the law. An overinclusive classification imposes a
burden upon a wider range of individuals than the legislature intended to be included in
the class of those at whom the law is aimed; e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (Court upheld an overinclusive military order whose purpose was to restrict the
activities of those who posed a threat of sabotage or espionage, but applied to all persons
of Japanese lineage). An underinclusive classification includes all the individuals in the
class intended, but leaves outside the classification others whom the law should have
included, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 366 U.S. 106 (1949) (Court upheld
an underinclusive ordinance that prohibited motor carriers from hiring out advertising
space on their trucks while allowing firms owning trucks to advertise their own products).
Tussman & ten-Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALU. L. REv. 341 (1949).
9. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Justice Powell's majority opin-
ion scrutinized the law in terms of the highest state court's articulation of the state
Equal Protection
Although retaining traditional minimal rationality standards
in reviewing socioeconomic legislation, the Warren Court's ex-
pansion of a second, higher level of scrutiny revolutionized equal
protection analysis." Under this two-tier scheme, the Court ap-
plies strict scrutiny if the legislation either infringes a fundamen-
tal right'2 or involves a suspect classification.' 3 Strict scrutiny
imposes two requirements that are absent from minimal rational-
ity review. First, the means must substantially, not merely mini-
mally, further the ends, because unlike minimal review, strict
scrutiny tolerates neither overinclusive nor underinclusive classi-
fications.'4 To assure the necessary relationship between the
means and the ends, the Court strikes down the statutory scheme
if other reasonable, less discriminatory, alternatives exist for ac-
complishing the legislative objective. Second, the Court requires
the state to advance a compelling, overriding justification for
infringing a fundamental interest or using a suspect classifica-
tion.'5
The post-Civil War case of Strauder v. West Virginia'" laid
the framework for heightened judicial review of legislation based
on suspect criteria. In Strauder, a black man convicted of murder
contended the state had denied him equal protection because no
black man was eligible for grand jury duty. Referring to the his-
torical reasons for the amendment's adoption, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had enacted the fourteenth amendment to
prevent continued inferior treatment of blacks.'7 According to
Strauder, the blacks were a historically disfavored class that so-
ciety had long regarded as an inferior race.'8 Viewing the black
race as uneducated and incapable of adequately protecting its
interests, the Court held that blacks commanded extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian process that had habitually en-
purposes. The Court refused to hypothesize possible purposes and, in fact, it refused to
consider additional purposes if the highest state court had not mentioned them. The Court
also inquired whether the challenged classification substantially contributed to the
achievement of each properly articulated purpose. But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
11. Gunther, supra note 1, at 8.
12. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634 (Court applied strict scrutiny
where legislation infringed the fundamental right to interstate travel). See note 55 infra.
13. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Court struck down statutory
scheme that prevented marriages between persons solely on basis of racial classifications).
14. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 637. See also Developments, supra
note 7, at 1101-04.
15. Developments, supra note 7, at 1087-91, 1124-32.
16. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
17. Id. at 306.
18. Id.
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gaged in racial discrimination. 9
Under the two-tier scheme, the Warren Court expanded the
rationale of suspect classifications beyond politically impotent
minorities.20 Courts now strictly scrutinize classifications involv-
ing groups historically subjected to class hatred or to sociological
badges of inferiority.2' Normally, these classifications are based
on immutable congenital traits over which the individual has no
control.22 Because such traits bear no relation to the individual's
ability to contribute to society, he or she should not suffer adverse
consequences.23 Based on this rationale, the Court also strictly
scrutinizes legislation affecting classes delineated by alienage2 1
and lineage.25
In addition to these well-established categories, the Warren
Court implied that classifications based on wealth might also be
suspect.26 The decisions indicating the suspectness of wealth,
however, involved access to the judicial or legislative processes
that the state primarily, if not exclusively, controls.2 ' Because the
p---a n st- ral, k C +-k.- +1,. state, , .A1SJ , -- . k4i.o .a es '
economic needs, the Burger Court has refused to expand strict
scrutiny of wealth classifications outside of the judicial and legis-
lative contexts.2Y Moreover, indigency does not meet the tradi-
19. Id.
20. The "protection from the majoritarian process" or "political powerlessness" ra-
tionale is also based on the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) where Justice Stone suggested that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152-53 n.4.
21. Developments, supra note 7, at 1127. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(illegitimacy); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (gender).
22. Developments, supra note 7, at 1126-27. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-
05 (1976).
23. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 504-05.
24. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (Court struck down state
scheme restricting welfare benefits to citizens and longtime resident aliens).
25. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (Court held that state's right to
formulate policy of landholding could not subordinate right of citizen to own land merely
because citizen's father was of Japanese ancestry).
26. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state cannot use a
poll tax as a condition for obtaining a ballot); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(state must provide counsel to an indigent criminal defendant on direct appeal); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide a trial transcript or its equivalent to an
indigent criminal defendant appealing his conviction on nonfederal grounds).
28. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973); Ortwin v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In essence, the
Burger Court appears to be curtailing the use of the equal protection clause by denying
claims of economic inequality when there is no significant denial of political equality or
access to the judicial process. See Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Equal Protection
tional criteria for determining suspectness. The multitude of gov-
ernment assistance programs demonstrate the poor are not a pol-
itically impotent minority. Additionally, indigency is not based
on immutable characteristics over which the individual has no
control, nor does indigency carry an obvious badge of inferiority. 9
Finally, discrimination against the poor has never been as severe
or pervasive as the historical and political discrimination against
racial minorities and aliens. 0
Besides suspect classifications, the Court also applies strict
scrutiny to legislation infringing fundamental rights. Skinner v.
Oklahoma,3' the progenitor of the fundamental rights strand of
equal protection analysis, invalidated a law requiring compulsory
sterilization for certain convicted felons. The Court held that the
legislation affected procreation, one of man's basic civil rights,
and that any deprivation of an individual's basic liberties de-
manded the Court's strict scrutiny to assure the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.3 2 Although the Consti-
tution does not identify fundamental rights explicitly, the Court
has derived these rights from the concept of liberty embodied in
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and the interests
protected by the Bill of Rights.33 The Court deems these rights
essential to a scheme of ordered liberty, based on "principle[s]
of justice rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple."34
Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. Rlv. 945, 1001-05
(1975).
29. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
30. See Justice Marshall's discussion of wealth discrimination in his dissent in
Rodriguez:
That wealth classifications alone have not necessarily been considered to bear
the same high degree of suspectness as have classifications based on, for in-
stance, race or alienage may be explainable on a number of grounds. The "poor"
may not be seen as politically powerless as certain discrete and insular minority
groups. Personal poverty may entail much the same social stigma as historically
attached to certain racial or ethnic groups. But personal poverty is not a perma-
nent disability; its shackles may be escaped. Perhaps, most importantly,
though, personal wealth may not necessarily share the general irrelevance as
basis for legislative action that race or nationality is recognized to have.
Id. at 121.
31. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
32. Id. at 541.
33. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937), overruled on other
grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
34. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Both Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and Snyder are due process cases. The Court has never
endorsed the proposition that those rights fundamental under the due process clause are
necessarily the same rights that the Court deems fundamental under the equal protection
clause. Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 661-
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The Warren Court expanded the concept of fundamental
rights into such areas as voting,35 criminal procedure, 3 and the
right to privacy,37 and implied that necessities such as welfare
benefits and housing might also be fundamental. 3 The Burger
Court, however, has declined to find a citizen's interests in wel-
fare39 and housing" fundamental. These interests have less con-
stitutional significance than the guarantee of effective equal
access to the criminal or political process because such economic
rights are not essential to the fourteenth amendment's concept
of liberty and equality.4 Economic equality is not constitu-
tionally mandated because it is not an interest protected by the
Bill of Rights nor is it essential to a scheme of ordered liberty.4"
Welfare and housing are in the area of social and economic legis-
lation and their assurance is a legislative, not a judicial, func-
tion . 3
The Burger Court's foreclosure of the more speculative as-
pects of strict scrutiny is not the only adaptation the Court has
mnde to t.hp rigid t.wn-tier qeheme. Although retaining the two-
tier scheme in form, the present Court has applied a spectrum of
standards that has blurred the sharp distinctions separating the
levels of scrutiny used by the Warren Court.44 Invocation of mini-
mal rationality review no longer signifies deference to the legisla-
62, argued that the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis infringes on
concepts of due process and threatens to destroy principled equal protection analysis.
Incorporation of due process's fundamental rights into equal protection analysis is an issue
beyond the scope of this comment.
35. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Court struck
down poll tax that state used as a condition for obtaining a ballot).
36. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide a trial tran-
script or its equivalent to an indigent criminal defendant appealing his conviction on
nonfederal grounds).
37. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of marital privacy
includes the right to use contraceptives).
38. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Although the Court decided
Shapiro on other grounds, note Justice Harlan's reference to the "Court's cryptic sugges-
tion [citation . . .I that the 'compelling interest' test is applicable merely because the
result of the classification may be to deny the appellees 'food, shelter, and other necessities
of life'." Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); text accompanying notes 80-84
infra.
40. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (Court upheld statute prescribing
judicial procedures for eviction of tenants after alleged nonpayment of rent).
41. See Developments, supra note 7, at 1192. See text accompanying note 28 supra
and notes 73-74 infra.
42. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 74.
43. Id.
44. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
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tive classification and automatic validation of the challenged
statute. Instead, the Burger Court appears to vary the standard
of review with which it scrutinizes classifications according to the
Court's own opinion of the constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected, and the suspectness with which
the particular classification is drawn. 5 Accordingly, various for-
mulations of mere rationality standards exist without any consis-
tent approach to their use. The Court's decision in Maher illus-
trates not only the Court's reluctance to expand strict scrutiny
analysis to welfare classifications, but also the Court's inconsis-
tency in minimal rationality review.
The equal protection claim before the Court in Maher in-
volved a state's distribution of Medicaid payments. Two indigent
women attacked the validity of a Connecticut welfare department
regulation denying state Medicaid benefits for first trimester
elective abortions. Under the state scheme, Medicaid paid for all
medically necessary abortions and childbirth, but denied pay-
ments for elective abortions." The plaintiffs contended that be-
cause women have a constitutionally protected right to have an
abortion,47 the government cannot restrict the ability of welfare
recipients to obtain abortions by refusing to provide them with
Medicaid funds. Finding no independent fundamental right to a
state-financed abortion, the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut nevertheless held the equal protection
clause forbids the exclusion of elective abortions from a state
welfare scheme that subsidized the medical expenses incident to
pregnancy and childbirth." Although the welfare scheme did not
involve a suspect class," the court agreed with the plaintiffs that
45. Id. A majority of the Court has not formally acknowledged Justice Marshall's
perception of the Court's equal protection analysis. See note 77 infra. Note also Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren:
[Tihe Court has had difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection
that can be applied consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications.There are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the "two-tier" approach that has
been prominent in the Court's decisions in the past decade. Although viewed
by many as a result-oriented substitute for more critical analysis, that ap-
proach-with its narrowly limited "upper-tier"-now has substantial preceden-
tial support.
429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976).
46. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 466.
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision). The Court noted the privacy right has been extended to activities
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education.
48. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975).
49. Although the district court did not address the issue of a suspect classification,
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by denying funds for elective abortions, the state directly influ-
enced the indigent woman's decision to exercise her constitution-
ally protected right to choose an abortion free from state interfer-
ence. 50
Relying on Roe v. Wade,5 the district court applied strict
scrutiny to determine whether the state had a compelling reason
to justify the disparate treatment of elective abortions and child-
birth. In Wade, the United States Supreme Court held that a
woman's decision to have an abortion is a fundamental interest
encompassed within the constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy.52 Because of the health risks of the abortion procedure and
the potentiality for future life, the right to choose abortion is not
absolute, but qualified according to the stage of pregnancy.
5 3
Wade, however, specifically held the state's important and legiti-
mate interests in the health of the mother and in protecting po-
tential life were not compelling during the first trimester of preg-
nancy.54 Moreover, the district court could find neither a fiscal
nor a moral interest compelling enough to justify the state's re-
fusal to pay for first trimester elective abortions: fiscally, abortion
costs much less than prenatal care followed by delivery, and mor-
ally, states cannot discriminate against those seeking to exercise
a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right.
The Supreme Court, however, declined to apply strict scru-
tiny to the socioeconomic legislation in Maher. 5' Although recog-
the Supreme Court noted that "[an indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come
within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases." 432 U.S.
at 470-71. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
50. 408 F. Supp. at 663-64.
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Id. at 152-53.
53. Prior to the end of the first trimester, the state must leave the abortion decision
and its effectuation to the medical judgment of the woman's physician. After the first
trimester, the state, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may regulate
the abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health. After viability, the
state in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may regulate and even
proscribe abortion except where necessary to save the life or health of the mother. Id. at
164-65. The state may regulate the abortion procedure at various stages because as the
woman approaches term each state interest eventually becomes compelling. Id. at 162-
63.
54. Id. at 163.
55. In distinguishing previous cases where the Court had strictly scrutinized welfare
classifications the Court said:
In [Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)] . . . durational residence requirements
for the receipt of public benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they"penalized" the exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate.
[Vol. 1:323
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nizing the existence of a fundamental right to choose to have an
abortion, the Court refused to find an impermissible infringe-
ment. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, emphasized that
the fundamental right in Wade was not an unqualified constitu-
tional right to make a procreation decision. Wade protects a
woman only from unduly burdensome interference with her free-
dom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. The denial
of welfare payments, even for the effectuation of a fundamental
interest, is not a burdensome interference. Although the state
may have influenced the woman's decision by not providing wel-
fare funding for an elective abortion, the state did not impose any
additional burden on the access to abortions." The Court held the
state regulation was merely a preference for one activity over an
alternate activity by selective state funding.57 Analogizing to pre-
vious decisions 8 the Court determined that a state did not need
a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor normal child-
birth, any more than a state has to justify its preference to fund
public, but not private education. 9 Because an important func-
tion of the legislative process is deciding to whom to distribute
• . . Penalties are most familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanc-
tions are imposed as a consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and
Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently
exercised the right to travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a
criminal fine to justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had ob-
tained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we would have
a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny might be appropriate
under . . . the penalty analysis .... But the claim here is that the State"penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by refusing to pay for it.
Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that States would penalize the right
to travel interstate by refusing to pay the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We
find no support in the right to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must
show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8.
56. Id. at 474.
57. The Court stated:
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternate activity consonant with legisla-
tive policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to
impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
Id. at 475-76.
58. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973), the Court explicitly rejected
an argument that preferential funding of public education over private or parochial
schools violated the equal protection clause. Although Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) held parents have a fundamental
right to choose alternate educational methods and schools, no corollary right as yet ex-
tends requiring states to fund private schools.
59. 432 U.S. at 477.
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tax revenues, ® the equal protection guarantee does not preclude
a state from adopting laws that fund one group differently from
another, nor is such a legislative decision a proper subject for
strict judicial review.6' The Court's only constitutional role in
reviewing such socioeconomic legislation is to determine the ra-
tionality of the legislative classification.6 2
Only when legislation prohibits or denies access to the means
of effectuating a fundamental right does the Court require a com-
pelling state interest." For example, the Court has found an abso-
lute denial of an essential means to effectuate a fundamental
right to privacy where a state prohibited distribution of nonmedi-
cal contraceptives except through licensed pharmacists. 4 Crimi-
nal sanctions imposed on physicians performing abortions are
also impermissible interferences with a pregnant woman's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy. 5 Similarly, the Court has held
a state's requirement of spousal consent to an abortion unconsti-
tutional as an absolute and unilateral veto preventing the effec-
tuation of a pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion. 6 The
Court also has struck down state procedural requirements when
used to deny elective abortions. 7 To the Court, however, the regu-
lation in Maher was inherently different from the above regula-
tions, not because of the quantity or quality of the infringement
imposed, but because of the source of the infringement. The
woman's indigency caused the infringement, not the state regula-
tions. The state did not cause the woman's poverty, nor did it
erect any monetary hurdles not already present; it merely failed
to remove them. 8 By placing no obstacles, absolute or otherwise,
in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion, the regulation did
not infringe the exercise of her fundamental right.
The Court did not apply strict scrutiny because the Constitu-
tion does not require states to pay for the implementation of
60. See Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat-
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 27.
61. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 1-20 (1971); Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARv. L. REv. 91, 94-99 (1966).
62. 432 U.S. at 477.
63. See note 55 supra.
64. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
67. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
68. See Comment, Abortion on Demand in a Post- Wade Context: Must the State Pay
the Bills?, 41 FoaDHAm L. REv. 921, 926 (1973). As the comment suggests, when an indigent
pregnant woman seeks an abortion, the doctor, not the state, creates the monetary hurdle.
[Vol. 1:323
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fundamental rights." Although a woman has a fundamental right
to decide to abort her pregnancy, she does not have a fundamen-
tal right to make the state pay for the abortion. 0 Although a
fundamental right exists to enjoy marital privacy, including the
right to use contraceptives, there is no fundamental right to have
the state supply the contraceptives.7 Although the Court has
declared a fundamental right exists to travel among the states,
there is no requirement that the state pay transportation charges
for indigents." Placing such affirmative obligations on govern-
ment would misinterpret the fourteenth amendment which re-
quires legal, not economic, equality. 73
Recognizing that the equal protection clause gives the Court
no power to impose its views upon the states of what constitutes
wise economic or social policy,7' the Burger Court indicated in its
early decisions that the Court would continue traditional mini-
mal rationality review of socioeconomic legislation .7 5 In most re-
cent decisions where the Burger Court purports to apply minimal
rationality review, however, the Court actually applies unex-
plained, intermediate levels of scrutiny requiring relatively thor-
ough examination of both means and ends.7" Instead of adhering
69. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) are narrow exceptions. In Griffin, a due process case, the Court required the state
to furnish an indigent criminal defendant with trial transcripts. In an analogous situation,
Boddie held an indigent could not be barred from securing a divorce because of inability
to pay state-assessed filing fees. In the later cases of United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973) and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the Court indicated it would not
extend Boddie to cover such matters as bankruptcy and state appellate court filing fees
in civil cases. The common element in this carefully limited category is the state "mo-
nopoly" on the effective forum, that is, the courts. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 469-71, nn.
5 & 6 (1977). Similarly, there may be a difference between cases arising under the due
process clause and those arising under the equal protection clause.
It is crucial in Maher that the state has no monopoly on performing abortions and,
in fact, is not in the business to any degree. It is only the money from the state which is
at issue and the absence of state funds will not absolutely prevent the plaintiffs from
obtaining the services which they desire. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 28, at 1001-
10; Developments, supra note 7, at 1192. See also note 28 supra.
70. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see note 55 supra.
73. See Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
SuP. CT. REv. 41, 86-102. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 28, at 998-1017.
74. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Developments, supra note
7, at 1192.
75. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
76. For example, see the Court's articulation of the appropriate standard of scrutiny
for gender-based classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Justice Brennan's
majority opinion stated that "classifications by gender must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
Id. at 197. In a concurrence, Justice Powell noted that "our decision today will be viewed
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to the all-or-none approach of the Warren Court, the Burger
Court appears to be varying the standard of review according to
the societal, as well as the constitutional, importance of the inter-
est adversely affected." Unexplained use of varying standards of
review can lead to result-oriented decisions based on judicial im-
position of values not tied to acceptable sources.7" To justify judi-
cial review of legislative classifications, the Court, as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution, must derive values from constitu-
tional text or history, rather than following its own predilec-
tions.79
The Burger Court's inconsistent approach to equal protec-
tion analysis is evident even within the narrow context of welfare
regulations. Early decisions such as Dandridge v. Williams0 and
its progeny8 indicated the Court's refusal to scrutinize strictly
welfare classifications. In Dandridge, the plaintiffs challenged
Maryland's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program
that limited benefits received per month per family, regardless of
the family's size or computed standard of need." The plaintiffs
attacked the limitation as discriminating among welfare recipi-
ents merely on the basis of family size. The United States District
Court for the District of Maryland invalidated the Maryland
scheme as overreaching because the program indiscriminately
by some as a 'middle-tier approach'." Id. at 211. Justice Rehnquist's dissent characterized
the majority's approach as one applying an elevated or "intermediate" level of scrutiny.
Id. at 217-22. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating a
Louisiana statute denying unacknowledged illegitimate children equal participation with
other dependent children in workmen's compensation death benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho law giving men preference over women
in being appointed administrators of estates).
77. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra. The majority in San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) specifically rejected Justice Marshall's "sliding
scale" approach. According to the majority, "the importance of a service performed by
the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of
examination under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 30. The Court also noted that:
[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights. [citation .. .I If the
degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a major-
ity's view of the importance of the interest affected, we would have gone "far
toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" . .. We would, indeed then,
be assuming a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority
and competence.
Id. at 31.
78. See generally Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. Rav.
693 (1976); Cox, supra note 61; Bork, supra note 61.
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Bork, supra note 61, at 8.
80. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
81. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971).
82. 397 U.S. at 473-75.
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resulted in disparity of welfare payments to the largest AFDC
families.8 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court determined the lower
court had used too stringent a standard of review. In upholding
the legislative scheme, the Court said the importance of welfare
benefits was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state
to justify its law by showing a compelling state interest." Instead,
the Court used minimal rationality review because the welfare
regulation concerned socioeconomic legislation not affecting free-
doms guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
A year after Dandridge, the four-to-three decision in
Richardson v. Belcher85 applied the minimal rationality stan-
dards of Dandridge to sustain provisions of the Social Security
Act. The challenged regulation required a reduction in disability
benefits to reflect state workmen's compensation receipts. Re-
quiring only legitimate goals and rationally related means, the
Court found a rational basis justifying the offset in the award.
The Court held that workmen's compensation and social security
programs served a common purpose, and, if overlapping, the
workmen's compensation programs should take precedence. By
finding Congress could rationally conclude that a federal program
duplicating the efforts of the states might gradually weaken state
programs, the Court hypothesized a conceivable, rational con-
gressional objective for the regulation. The Court then pointed
83. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
84. In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend
the Constitution . . . . To be sure, the cases . . . enunciating this fundamental
standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved state
regulation of business or industry. The administration of public welfare assis-
tance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings. We recognize the dramatically real and factual difference be-
tween the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a
different constitutional standard.
397 U.S. at 485 (footnote omitted).
Justice Marshall's dissent in Dandridge, however, objected to the limitation on
grounds that the class of individuals who actually received payments was grossly underin-
clusive because Congress had designed the AFDC program to assist all needy dependent
children. Justice Marshall stated that such underinclusiveness manifested a prima facie
violation of the equal protection requirement of a reasonable classification. Upon such a
violation, the Court should require the state to come forward with a persuasive justifica-
tion for the classification. The reasoning of the majority, however, was consistent with
traditional minimal review standards which allow underinclusiveness, because the Court
permitted the legislature to solve one problem at a time and act where the state believes
the harm is most acute. Moreover, contrary to Justice Marshall's reasoning, minimal
review standards do not require the state to substantiate the justification.
85. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
86. Id. at 79 n.1.
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out that it is not for the judiciary to say whether Congress might
have accomplished its purpose more reasonably by applying the
same offset to recipients of private insurance."7
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno"' is the
first case in which the Court applied an intermediate test to a
classification limiting welfare disbursements.8 9 Although the
Court purported to invoke the minimal rationality test, it ac-
tually applied an intermediate, unarticulated standard. The stat-
ute in Moreno excluded from participation in the food stamp
program any household containing an individual who was unre-
lated to any other member in the household. 0 The government
argued that unrelated households are more likely than related
ones to contain individuals who abuse the program and that the
challenged classification was rationally related to the legitimate
governmental interest in minimizing fraud in the administration
of the program. The government contended that the relative in-
stability of unrelated households increases the difficulty of de-
tecting fraud. The Court, however, reasoned that the exclusion
of unrelated households from the program did not rationally
further prevention of spurious claims because unrelated persons
can avoid the exclusion simply by changing their living arrange-
ments. Moreover, the practical effect of the classification was to
exclude those whom the Food Stamp Act was designed to assist.
In addition, the Court found that familial relationship was unre-
lated to raising nutritional levels in low income households or
stimulating the economy, and therefore the classification was also
irrelevant to the stated purposes of the program.
The Court's analysis of the relationship between the exclu-
sion of unrelated households and the prevention of abuse resem-
bles strict scrutiny more closely than minimal scrutiny.9 Under
87. Id. at 84.
88. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
89. See note 55 supra for discussion of Shapiro and Maricopa County, where the
Court strictly scrutinized welfare classifications if the state used durational residency
requirements as a penalty. Outside of this narrow context, the Court has always applied
or purported to have applied minimal rationality scrutiny when reviewing welfare classifi-
cations.
90. 413 U.S. at 529.
91. In fact, Justice Douglas's concurrence rested on a strict scrutiny, rather than
minimal rationality, analysis. Although the challenged provision had a rational relation
to control of fraud, he said that standards higher than Dandridge should apply because
the classification touched on "associational rights that lie in the penumbra of the First
Amendment." Id. at 541-45. He viewed the case as involving desperately poor people with
acute problems who, though unrelated, come together for mutual help and assistance, and
thus this banding together of the poor was an expression of the right of freedom of associa-
tion.
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minimal rationality review, the Court would have given the gov-
ernment a presumption of rationality and would have upheld the
regulation given any rational argument the regulation would pre-
vent fraudulent claims to food stamps. Rather than accepting the
government's rational argument regarding administrative effi-
ciency, the Court in Moreno required the government to substan-
tiate its rationalization of the statute."
Welfare classifications again met with intermediate scrutiny
in Jimenez v. Weinberger.3 The regulation in Jimenez denied
disability benefits under the Social Security Act to some illegiti-
mate children born after the onset of their wage earner parent's
disability." The Court not only rejected the minimal rationality
test used in Dandridge, but as in Moreno, the Court also rejected
the state's articulated interpretation of the statute's purpose. In
emphasizing the discrimination among classes of illegitimate
children, the Court found no evidence supporting the state's con-
tention that allowing benefits to illegitimates in the appellants'
classification would necessitate reducing the scope of persons the
Act benefited. Additionally, the Court found that the classifica-
tion was both overinclusive and underinclusive. The Court deter-
mined that
even if children might rationally be classified on the basis of
whether they are dependent upon their disabled parents, the
Act's definition of these two subclasses of illegitimates is"overinclusive" in that it benefits some children who are legiti-
92. One writer has commented:
Justice Brennan's view that abusers will avoid the exclusion by changing their
living arrangements [citation . . .1 may be quite unrealistic. In deciding
whether to avoid the exclusion, members of unrelated households are faced with
precisely the same calculation whether they are abusers or persons truly in need.
They must decide whether the costs of changing living arrangements are out-
weighed by the benefits of eligibility. Moreover, the typical abuser-a university
student or a commune dweller-is likely to find the costs of changing relatively
high. Most likely he is unrelated to anyone else in this present household, or for
that matter to anyone with whom he would consider living. Even if he did
consider living with his relatives desirable, they are by hypothesis likely to be
too well off to form a household eligible for stamps. So the typical abuser will
probably have to live alone to be eligible. Thus he must sacrifice the economy
and possible psychological benefits of living with others in order to gain food
stamps which, again by hypothesis, he does not desperately need. Thus while
Justice Brennan may be correct in stating that abusers have the ability to avoid
the exclusion, his analysis ignores the point that the exclusion can work by
destroying the incentive to abuse.
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAav. L. REv. 1, 132 n.40 (1973). See also note 108
infra.
93. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
94. Id. at 631 n.2.
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mated, or entitled to inherit, or illegitimate solely because of a
defect in the marriage of their parents, but who were not depen-
dent on their disabled parents. Conversely, the classification is"underinclusive" because it conclusively excludes some illegiti-
mates in appellants' subclass who were, in fact, dependent upon
their disabled parents."
Having lost the presumption of constitutionality," the state could
not establish the rationality of its classifications. Accordingly,
under this unarticulated, intermediate standard of review, the
Court held the legislation unconstitutional because the govern-
ment could not substantiate the validity of its classifications.
Justice Rehnquist dissented, finding the majority's equal
protection analysis "perplexing."97 Insisting that minimal ration-
ality was appropriate, he stated that any rationale for giving some
form of stricter scrutiny to classifications distinguishing legiti-
mates from illegitimates vanished when the alleged discrimina-
tion distinguished classes of illegitimates.1' As he read the Court's
opinin, hp govPrnment would have to compile evidence to sup-
port any challenged legislation. Finding it "strange" that the
government had to present evidence to justify each and every
classification made, he said that courtrooms should not become
forums for a second round of legislative hearings every time a
legislative determination is challenged.9 Moreover, Justice
Rehnquist agreed with the lower court that the classifications
rested upon a rational basis because any increase in the number
of eligible recipients would obviously further deplete a fixed fund.
Although Moreno and Jimenez indicate the Court's intention
to apply a more demanding standard than minimal rationality
review, the Court's subsequent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi'"
reiterated and applied the traditional deferential test. Salfi re-
versed a decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California invalidating duration-of-
relationship requirements that determined the eligibility of sur-
viving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners for social
security payments. 01 The district court concluded the nine-
month requirements constituted irrebuttable presumptions 02
95. Id. at 637.
96. For a discussion of the presumption of constitutionality, see note 7 supra.
97. 417 U.S. at 638.
98. Id. at 639.
99. Id. at 640-41.
100. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
101. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
102. The Court's use of irrebuttable presumption analysis has evoked criticism, both
[Vol. 1:323
Equal Protection
which were constitutionally invalid. On appeal, the Supreme
Court refused to apply the irrebuttable presumptions approach
and instead applied the traditional minimal rationality test. The
Court held that although such a limitation will undoubtedly
prove underinclusive or overinclusive in particular cases, the gov-
ernment may apply such limitations so long as the limitations
comport with the standards of legislative reasonableness enunci-
ated in cases such as Dandridge and Richardson.10 3 Comparing
the social security plan with commercial insurance policies that
traditionally rely upon fixed prophylactic rules to protect against
abuses, the Court found the government program a widely ac-
cepted response to legitimate interests in administrative economy
and certainty of coverage for those meeting the program's terms.
The Court framed the question of constitutionality as whether
Congress, legitimately desiring to avoid the possibility of abuse,
rationally could have concluded both that a particular limitation
would protect against abuse, and that the expense and other
difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent
imprecision of a prophylactic rule. 01 Applying such a deferential
test, the Court concluded that the duration-of-relationship re-
quirements met this constitutional standard.
A comparison of Salfi with United States Department of Ag-
riculture v. Murry, 05 an earlier irrebuttable presumption case,
illustrates an inconsistency in the Court's analysis. Murry con-
cerned a Food Stamp Act regulation denying stamp benefits to
households containing at least one member claimed as a tax de-
pendent by a member of another household in the preceding
year.10 Finding this restriction designed to limit the class of food
on and off the Court. See, e.g., Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534 (1974). In general, irrebuttable presumption analy-
sis
involves an inquiry into the relationship between legislative goals and the statu-
tory classifications designed to promote them. Where a statute contains rules
denying a benefit or imposing a burden on the basis of a particular characteris-
tic, a court using irrebuttable presumption analysis will treat that classification
as a means of identifying the statute's ultimate purpose. The court will then
examine the relationship between the statutorily defined characteristic (the
basic fact) and facts that the presumed purpose of the classification would make
relevant (presumed facts). If it is not "universally true" that the basic fact
implies the presumed facts, the statute will be deemed an impermissible irre-
buttable presumption, violative of due process.
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 81 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
103. 422 U.S. at 768-74.
104. Id. at 777.
105. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
106. The exclusion contained in § 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b)
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stamp beneficiaries to the needy, the Court held the government
could not conclusively presume lack of need on the basis of tax
dependence in a prior year. Salfi distinguished Murry on grounds
that the statute in Murry involved an irrational classification. 17
The duration-of-relationship requirements in Salfi appear as ov-
erinclusive and underinclusive in terms of the legislative goal as
the tax dependence classification involved in Murry. 108
Upon a closer examination of Murry, minimal rationality
appears satisfied. Justice Rehnquist found a correlation between
a household's ineligibility for food stamps and the fact that the
same household has a member claimed as a dependent by a mem-
ber of another ineligible household. According to the tax laws, a
dependent is one who receives over one-half his support from
someone whose income is enough to disqualify his own household
for food stamps. This indicated to Justice Rehnquist that the
dependent is receiving significant support and thus it was ra-
tional to assume he is ineligible for food stamps. 0
Factually, Dandridge, Moreno, Jimenez, and Salfi seem in-
distinguishable, and in each case the Court explicitly articulated
the traditional minimal rationality test. Yet in Moreno and
Jimenez, the Court upheld the constitutional claim without men-
tioning the strict scrutiny formula. After an era during which
minimal rationality symbolized judicial abdication, the Burger
Court has intervened inconsistently under the traditional mini-
mal rationality standard by rejecting articulated rational govern-
mental objectives and requiring substantiated means.
Maher is the first case in which the Court actually articulates
a stricter rationality test when reviewing a welfare classification.
Although the Court applied traditional minimal rationality, it
states an "articulated rationality" test:
(1970), was designed to eliminate from the program households containing individuals
with alternative sources of support. Id. at 515.
107. 422 U.S. at 772.
108. An alternative explanation to Murry and Moreno, which were companion cases,
may indicate why the Court chose to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny. In Moreno,
Justice Brennan indicated the challenged statute was an attempt to discriminate against
hippie communes and hippies, a politically unpopular group. 413 U.S. at 534. The inter-
mediate level of scrutiny in Murry and Moreno, then, may represent an attempt by the
Court to protect a discrete minority from discrimination on the basis of a quasi-suspect
classification. However, the facts do not indicate an attack on hippies, but rather an
attack on children of affluent families, who may or may not be hippies. United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
109. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
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We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to
the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fun-
damental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Consti-
tution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny . . . . If not,
the [legislative] scheme must still be examined to determine
whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state
purpose ... .1o
Based on long-standing connotations of the old equal protection,
the Court gave deference to a broad range of conceivable legisla-
tive purposes and to imaginable facts that might justify the clas-
sification. Under the confines of the articulated rationality test,
however, judicial conjecturing of state objectives would seem in-
appropriate, if not intolerable. Articulated rationality standards
also require the Court to accept explicit governmental objectives
supported by rational means.
The articulated rationality test differs fundamentally from
the intermediate test applied in Moreno and Jimenez. The inter-
mediate test primarily emphasizes a means-oriented scrutiny.",
Moreno and Jimenez required the legislative means substantially
to further legislative ends; that is, the means must have substan-
tial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Because the gov-
ernment in those cases did not present a substantiated rationale,
the Court refused to engage in judicial hypothesizing to find a
conceivable basis. By contrast, the articulated rationality test
emphasizes the constitutional permissibility of the ends and re-
quires only rational, not substantial, means.
Admittedly, an ends-focused test has special problems in
application. The Court must decide what data are relevant re-
garding purpose. Intermediate scrutiny, with its emphasis on
means, does not delve into actual legislative motivation;"' but
articulated rationality scrutiny, with its emphasis on ends, de-
mands an inquiry into any available circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent."' An examination of a decision's historical
110. 432 U.S. at 470 (emphasis added), quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. at 17.
111. Gunther, supra note 1, at 20-21.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977). See also note 5 supra. Justice Powell's majority opinion in Arlington Heights
rejected the Court of Appeals's emphasis on effect rather than purpose and reaffirmed the
principle established in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that an impermissible,
unconstitutional purpose is critical in sustaining an equal protection violation. Note also
Justice Brennan's comment in Craig v. Boren:
For this appeal we find adequate the appellee's representation of legislative
purpose, leaving for another day consideration of whether the statement of the
1978]
342 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 1:323
background, including the specific sequence of events leading up
to the challenged decision, may help explain the legislative pur-
pose. Departures from the normal procedural or substantive sequ-
ence also might afford evidence of improper purposes, particu-
larly if the legislature's consideration of important factors favors
a contrary decision."' Likewise, irrational means might implicitly
indicate unconstitutional or politically unpopular objectives. 15
Maher purports to use an articulated rationality standard of
review, but the Court applied the traditional test which allows
the Court to hypothesize conceivable state purposes. Apparently
disregarding the constraints of an articulated rationality test, the
Court did not consider the proffered objective, but rather relied
upon the language of Wade where the Court held the state has
an important and legitimate interest in protecting fetal life.
Maher held that this strong and legitimate interest, although not
compelling until viability, nevertheless exists throughout the
woman's entire term of pregnancy. Finding a strong and legiti-
mate state interest in encouraging childbirth, the Court con-
State's Assistant Attorney General should suffice to inform this Court of the
legislature's objectives, or whether the Court must determine if the litigant
simply is selecting a convenient, but false, post-hoc rationalization.
429 U.S. at 200 n.7. The Court also gave heightened inquiry into actual purpose in Cali-
fano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). In Goldfarb the Court stated that the "mere
recitation" of a legitimate purpose will not shield automatically the statute from judicial
inquiry into the "actual purposes underlying a legislative scheme." Id. at 209 n.8. In
examining the statute's background, the Court found the statute's legislative history
refuted appellant's contention of a legitimate governmental objective. Although Arlington
Heights, Craig, and Goldfarb are cases involving suspect or quasi-suspect classes, in
several recent cases the Court gave heightened ends scrutiny to equal protection claims
challenging purely economic regulations. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) which the Maher case cited as the appropriate equal protec-
tion standard applicable to cases involving neither a suspect classification nor a funda-
mental right and New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) where the Court found the
legislation rationally promoted the objective the government "identified." The above
cases indicate not only the Court's willingness, but also the appropriateness of delving into
actual purpose by examining articulated purposes and looking at relevant legislative
history.
114. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at
267.
115. The call for testing the rationality of means on the basis of state-articulated
purposes raises other complications as well. A legislature may legitimately have a multi-
plicity of purposes, especially in carving exceptions from the scope of a general statute.
Court inquiry should not be limited to a primary purpose; subsidiary purposes may also
support the rationality of a means. The model would call on the Court to be receptive to
all purposes, few or many, articulated by the state. It would not, for example, have the
Court disbelieve some asserted state purposes and artificially test the means in the context
of a single purpose chosen by the Court, in the manner of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
Gunther, supra note 1, at 47.
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cluded the state chose a rational means of furthering that objec-
tive by subsidizing costs incident to childbirth, and denying ben-
efits for elective abortions.
Connecticut, however, did not argue that the regulation's
purpose was to protect potential life. The state contended theregulation was "to control the amount of its limited public funds
which will be allocated to its welfare budget.""' If Maher had
limited its inquiry to the articulated state purpose, the majority
likely would have found the legislative means of denying elective
abortions did not rationally further the state's articulated objec-
tive of controlling its public welfare budget. Abortion is far less
costly than a course of prenatal care followed by delivery." 7 More-
over, as noted by the district court:
[TIhe birth of a child to a welfare mother increases the burdenon the state's welfare coffers because the newly-born indigentchild will, in all likelihood, qualify for state welfare assistance.The state's assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay
the cost of a welfare mother's abortion is simply contrary to
undisputed facts."18
The decision in Maher illustrates why the Court should use
an articulated rationality test in reviewing socioeconomic legisla-
tion. Especially within the context of public assistance programs,
an articulated rationality test appears more appropriate than an
intermediate standard that substantially reduces leeway for legis-
lative experimentations. Articulated rationality review is alsopreferable to deferential minimal rationality scrutiny. Limiting
judicially-cognizable purposes to those explicitly set forth in astatutory preamble or the legislative history, rather than allowing
the Court to hypothesize a legitimate objective on its own, deters
value-laden appraisal of the legitimacy of the ends.
Although this approach obviously will encourage imagination in
the defenders of legislation to articulate a range of legitimatingpurposes, that need not imply that the [test] encourages futilejudicial gestures. Articulation of legitimating purposes would
avoid judicial invalidation, to be sure. But it would do so at thecost of greater explicitness as to the reasons justifying the legis-lative means; and it would encourage the airing and critique ofthose reasons in the state's political process."'
116. Brief for Appellants at 23, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
117. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1975).
118. Id.
119. Gunther, supra note 1, at 47.
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If Connecticut had engaged in such a critique and determined
that the underlying, implicit purpose of the anti-abortion regula-
tion was the legislature's moral objection to abortion, the Court
could legitimately find that denying welfare payments for elective
abortions was a rational means of effectuating the valid govern-
mental interest in regulating public morals.'2 If Connecticut re-
fused to articulate such a controversial objective for fear of politi-
cal reprisals, the Court should not hypothesize conceivable inter-
ests to validate means that are not rationally related to state-
articulated objectives.
An examination of the Burger Court's decisions from
Dandridge to Maher illustrates this need for a principled, consis-
tent approach to judicial review of welfare legislation. The Burger
Court has acknowledged that strict scrutiny is not an appropriate
standard of review for welfare legislation because welfare recipi-
ents are not a suspect class and a fundamental right to welfare
does not exist. The Constitution, however, does impose certain
procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration.
Under the Warren Court, classifications met fourteenth amend-
ment procedural safeguards if the legislative scheme rationally
furthered some conceivable, legitimate legislative objective. Hy-
pothesizing legitimate objectives, as the Burger Court did in
Maher, is an inadequate and unprincipled approach to judicial
review of socioeconomic legislation because it can lead to judicial,
rather than constitutional, appraisal of the legitimacy of the
ends. An articulated rationality test also emphasizes the legiti-
macy of the ends, but the scope of review is substantially nar-
rowed and more principled than deferential minimal rationality
review. Under an articulated rationality test, the Court must con-
fine judicial review to explicit governmental objectives. Once the
Court has determined the legislature acted within permissible
constitutional objectives and the means are rationally related to
the articulated objectives, judicial inquiry should end. The inter-
mediate test's requirement that the means substantially further
the ends is unsuited to legislation concerning the economic, philo-
sophical, and social problems presented by public assistance pro-
grams. Requiring legitimate, state-articulated objectives, imple-
mented by rational means, provides not only the necessary con-
120. Wade held that during the first trimester no state interest was compelling
enough to justify interference with a woman's fundamental right to abortion. Maher held
that denial of welfare payments was not an impingement of a fundamental right, but
rather state encouragement of an alternate activity which required only a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state objective, such as regulating the public morals.
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stitutional safeguards, but also the flexibility required by the
legislature to make innovative and hopefully better solutions to
the problems presented by welfare administration.
Lynda D. Frazier
